米克瑪克文翻譯Michael Sandel: All right. So you come down on the straight Benthamite side. Who is to judge? And why should be judge? Apart from just registering and aggregating de facto preference. Alright翻譯社 that’s fair enough. What's your name? Nate翻譯社 OK fair enough. All right, so how many people think The Simpsons is actually, apart from liking it, is actually the higher experience? Higher than Shakespeare? All right let’s see the vote for Shakespeare again, how many think Shakespeare is higher? All right翻譯社 so why is it, ideally I’d like to hear from someone, is there someone who thinks Shakespeare is highest but who preferred watching The Simpsons? Yes.
Michael Sandel: I know翻譯社 but which do you think was worthiest and noblest experience? I know you found it the most entertaining.

第四堂課快樂的高低級How To Measure Pleasure英文字幕

Michael Sandel: Last time翻譯社 last time we began to consider some objections to Jeremy Bentham's version of utilitarianism. People raised two objections in the discussion we had, the first was the objection, the claim that utilitarianism by concerning itself with the greatest good for the greatest number fails adequately to respect individual rights. Today we have debates about torture and terrorism, suppose a suspected terrorist was apprehended on September 10th and you had reason to believe that the suspect had crucial information about an impending terrorist attack that would kill over 3000 people, and you couldn’t extract the information. Would it be just to torture the suspect to get the information? Or do you say no, there is a categorical moral duty of respect for individual rights?
In a way we are back to the questions we started with about trolley cars and organ transplants. So that's the first issue. And you remember we considered some examples of cost benefit analysis, but a lot of people were unhappy with cost-benefit analysis when it came to placing a dollar value on human life. And so that led us to the second objection, It questioned whether it is possible to translate all values into a single uniform measure of value. It asks, in other words翻譯社 whether all values are commensurable. Let me give you one other example of an experience, this actually is a true story, it comes from personal experience, that raises a question at least about whether all values can be translated without loss into a utilitarian terms. Some years ago, when I was a graduate student, I was at Oxford in England, and the men’s, they had men and women's colleges. They weren’t yet mixed, and the women's colleges had rules against overnight male guests. By the 1970s these rules were rarely enforced and easily violated, or so I was told. By the late 1970s, when I was there, pressure grew to relax these rules and it became the subject of debate among the faculty at St. Ann's college翻譯社 which is one of these all women’s colleges. The older women on the faculty were traditionalist. They were opposed to change on conventional moral grounds翻譯社 but times had changed and they were embarrassed to give the true grounds for their objections and so they translated their arguments into utilitarian terms. If men stay overnight they argued the costs to the college will increase. How you might wonder翻譯社 well they’ll want to take baths and that will use up hot water they say. Furthermore they argued we will have to replace the mattresses more often. The reformers met these arguments by adopting the following compromise; each woman could have a maximum of three overnight male guests each week. They didn’t say whether it had to be the same one or three different ones翻譯社 provided, and this was the compromise翻譯社 provided the guests paid 50 pence to defray the costs to the college. Next day翻譯社 the national headline in the national newspaper read “St. Ann's girls 50 pence a night”, another illustration of the difficulty of translating all values, in this case a certain idea of virtue翻譯社 into utilitarian terms. So that's all to illustrate the second objection to utilitarianism翻譯社 at least part of that objection that questions whether utilitarianism is right to assume that we can assume uniformity of value, the commensurability of all values and translate all moral considerations into dollars or money. But there is a second aspect to this worry about aggregating values and preferences. Why should we weigh all preferences翻譯社 that people have翻譯社 without assessing whether they are good preferences or bad preferences翻譯社 shouldn't we distinguish between higher pleasures and lower pleasures? Now part of the appeal of not making any qualitative distinctions about the worth of people’s preferences翻譯社 part of the appeal is that it is nonjudgmental and egalitarian. The Bethamite utilitarian says, everybody's preferences count and they count regardless of what people want. Regardless of what makes different people happy翻譯社 for Bentham all that matters, you will remember, are the intensity and the duration of a pleasure or pain. The so-called higher pleasures or nobler virtues are simply those, according to Bentham, that produce stronger, longer pleasure. He had a famous phrase to express this idea, “the quantity of pleasure being equal, push pin is as good as poetry.” What was push pin? And it was some sort of child’s game翻譯社 like Tiddley Winks, push pin is as good as poetry Bentham says. Lying behind this idea翻譯社 I think翻譯社 is the claim, the intuition翻譯社 that it's a presumption to judge. Whose pleasures are intrinsically higher or worthier or better? And there is something attractive in this refusal to judge翻譯社 after all some people like Mozart翻譯社 others Madonna. Some like ballet, others bowling. Who's to say, a Benthamite might argue, who’s to say which of these pleasures, whose pleasures are higher, worthier, nobler than others. But is that right? This refusal to make qualitative distinctions? Can we all together dispense with the idea that certain things we take pleasure in are better or worthier than others? Think back to the case of the Romans in the Coliseum, one thing that troubled people about that practice is that it seemed to violate the rights of the Christians. Another way to objecting to what's going on there is that the pleasure that the Romans take in this bloody spectacle should that pleasure, which is a base kind of corrupt degrading pleasure, should that even be valorized or weighed when deciding what the, what the general welfare is? So here are the objections to Bentham’s utilitarianism. And now we turn to someone who tried to respond to those objections. A later day utilitarian, John Stuart Mill, so what we need to examine now is whether John Stuart Mill had a convincing reply to these objections to utilitarianism. John Stuart Mill was born in 1806, his father, James Mill, was a disciple of Bentham’s and James Mill set about giving his son, John Stuart Mill, a model education. He was a child prodigy, John Stuart Mill, he knew Latin at the age of翻譯社 sorry, Greek at the age of three, Latin at 8 and at age 10 he wrote a history of Roman Law. At age 20, he had a nervous breakdown. This left him in a depression for five years, but at the age of 25 what helped lift him out of this depression is that he met Harriet Taylor. She and Mill got married, and they lived happily ever after and it was under her influence that John Stuart Mill tried to humanize utilitarianism, what Mill tried to do was to see whether the utilitarian calculus could be enlarged and modified to accommodate humanitarian concerns like the concerns with respect to individual rights and also to address the distinction between higher and lower pleasures. In 1859 Mill wrote a famous book on liberty. The main point in which was the importance of defending individual rights and minority rights and in 1861 toward the end of his life he wrote the book we read as part of this course, Utilitarianism. He makes it clear that utility is the only standard for morality, in his view, so he’s not challenging Bentham’s premise, he’s affirming it. He says very explicitly “the sole evidence that it is possible to produce that anything is desirable is that people actually do desire it.” So he stays with the idea that our de facto actual empirical desires are the only basis for moral judgment翻譯社 but then on page eight, and also in chapter two翻譯社 he argues that it is possible for a utilitarian to distinguish higher from lower pleasures. Now those of you who have read Mill already, how翻譯社 according to him翻譯社 is it possible to draw that distinction? How can a utilitarian distinguish qualitatively higher pleasures from lesser ones base ones, unworthy ones?
Michael Sandel: Well let me … What’s your name?
Michael Sandel: Yeah.
Michael Sandel: And, tell me your name.
Joe: Although I enjoyed watching The Simpsons more in this particular moment in Justice, if I were to spend the rest of my life considering the three different video clips shown. I would not want to spend that remainder of my life considering the latter two clips. I think I would derive more pleasure from being able to branch out in my own mind, sort of considering more deep pleasures, more deep thoughts.
Nate: if something is good just because it is pleasurable, well what does it matter whether you have some sort of abstract idea of whether if it is good by someone else's sense.
Laneshia: Laneshia
Michael Sandel: So you think that this supports Mill….. You think Mill is onto something here?
Hamlet: What a piece of work is a man, how noble in reason, how infinite in faculties, in form and moving, how express and admirable翻譯社 in action how like an angel翻譯社 an apprehension, how like a god. The beauty of the world. The paragon of animals翻譯社 and yet to me翻譯社 what is this quintessence dust? Man delights not me.
Yes.
Joe: Joe
Nate: I found that one the most entertaining
Michael Sandel: All right you are saying it takes education to appreciate higher things. Mill’s point is that the higher pleasures do require cultivation and appreciation and education. He doesn't dispute that. But once having been cultivated, and educated, people will see, not only see the difference between higher and lower pleasures翻譯社 but will actually prefer the higher to the lower. You will find this famous passage from John Stuart Mill翻譯社 “It is better to be a human being dissatisfied than a pig satisfied翻譯社 better to be Socrates dissatisfied than a fool satisfied and if the fool or the pig are of a different opinion it is because they only know their side of the question.” So here you have an attempt to distinguish higher from lower pleasures翻譯社 so going to an art museum or being a couch potato and swilling beer and watching television at home. Sometimes Mill agrees we might succumb to the temptation to do the latter翻譯社 to be couch potatoes. But even when we do that翻譯社 out of indolence and sloth, we know, that the pleasure we get gazing at Rembrandts in the museum is actually higher, because we have experienced both, and it is a higher pleasure, gazing at Rembrandt, because it engages our higher human faculties. What about Mill’s attempt to reply to the objection about individual rights? In a way he uses the same kind of argument翻譯社 and this comes out in chapter five. He says翻譯社 I dispute the pretensions of any theory that sets up an imaginary standard of justice not grounded on utility, but still he considers justice grounded on utility to be what he calls the chief part and incomparably the most sacred and binding part of all morality. So justice is higher翻譯社 individuals rights are privileged but not for reasons that depart from utilitarian assumptions, justice is a name for certain moral requirements which regarded collectively stand higher in the scale of social utility and are therefore of more paramount obligation than any others. So justice is sacred翻譯社 it’s prior翻譯社 it’s privileged, it isn't something that can be easily traded off against lesser things. But the reason is ultimately, Mill claims, a utilitarian reason once you consider the long run interests of humankind, of all of us as progressive beings. If we do justice and if we respect rights, society as a whole will be better off in the long run. Well is that convincing or is Mill actually, without admitting it, stepping outside utilitarian considerations and arguing for qualitatively higher pleasures and for sacred or especially important individual rights? We haven’t fully answered that question, because to answer that question, in the case of rights and justice, will require that we explore other ways non-utilitarian ways of accounting for the basis of rights and then asking whether they succeed. As for Jeremy Bentham, who launched utilitarianism as a doctrine and moral and legal philosophy, Bentham died in 1832 at the age of 85 but if you go to London you can visit him today, literally翻譯社 he provided in his will that his body be preserved, embalmed and displayed in the University of London翻譯社 where he still presides in a glass case with a wax head. Dressed in his actual clothing, you see before he died Bentham addressed himself to a question consistent with his philosophy; of what use could a dead man be to the living? One use he said was to make one's corpse available to the study of anatomy. In the case of great philosophers, however, better yet to preserve one's physical presence in order to inspire future generations of thinkers. You want to see what Bentham looks like a stuffed? Here’s what he looks like. There he is. Now, if you look closely you will notice that the embalming of his actual head was not a success so they substituted a wax head翻譯社 and at the bottom for verisimilitude. You can actually see his actual head on a plate. You see it? Right there. So what's the moral of story? The moral of the story, by the way they bring him out during meetings of the Board at University College London and the minutes record him as present but not voting. Here is a philosopher, in life and in death, who adhered to the principles of his philosophy. We will continue with rights next time.
Who else? Yes.
Michael Sandel: Laneshia, when you say that someone told you that Shakespeare is better. Are you accepting it on blind faith? You voted that Shakespeare is higher only because the culture tells you that or teachers tell you that, or do you actually agree with that yourself?
Joe: I do.
Michael Sandel: I don’t even have to ask which one you like most. The Simpsons? How many like The Simpsons most? How many Shakespeare? What about Fear Factor? How many preferred Fear Factor? Really? People overwhelmingly like The Simpsons better than Shakespeare, now let's take the other part of the poll. Which is the highest experience or pleasure, how many say Shakespeare? How many say Fear Factor? No, you can't be serious. Really? What? All right翻譯社 go ahead. You can say it.
Student: Ahh If whatever is good is truly just whatever people prefer, it’s truly relative and there’s no objective definition then there will be some society where people prefer The Simpsons more ahh翻譯社 anyone can appreciate the Simpsons but I think it does take education to appreciate Shakespeare
Michael Sandel: Right, so some of this seems to be you’re suggesting a kind of a cultural convention and pressure. We are told what books, what works of art are great.
Michael Sandel: So, as John points out, Mill says here's the test. Since we can't step outside actual desires, actual preferences翻譯社 that would violate utilitarian premises, the only test of whether a pleasure is higher or lower is whether someone who has experience both would prefer it. And here in chapter two, we see the passage where Mill makes the point that John just described. “Of two pleasures翻譯社 if there be one to which all or almost all who have experience of both give a decided preference翻譯社 irrespective of any feeling of moral obligation to prefer it翻譯社” in other words no outside翻譯社 no independent standard “then that is the more desirable pleasure.” What do people think about that argument? Does that翻譯社 does it succeed? How many think that it does succeed? Of arguing within utilitarian terms for the distinction between higher and lower pleasures? How many think it doesn't succeed? I want to hear your reasons. But before we give the reasons翻譯社 let's do an experiment of Mill’s claim. In order to do this experiment we’re going to look at three short excerpts of popular entertainment. The first one is Hamlet's soliloquy. It will be followed by two other experiences. See what you think.
John: John
Laneshia: Well in the sense of翻譯社 in the sense of Shakespeare, no, but earlier you made a an example of Rembrandt. I feel that I would enjoy reading a comic book more then I would enjoy kind of analyzing Rembrandt, because someone told me it was great, you know.
Joe: In bio biology, neurobiology last year. We were told of a rat, who is tested, particular center in the brain where the rat was able to stimulate its brain and cost itself intense pleasure repeatedly. The rat did not eat or drink until it died. Umm so the rat was clearly experiencing intense pleasure. Now if you ask me right now if I would I rather experience intense pleasure or have a full lifetime of higher pleasure. I would consider intense pleasure to be low pleasure. I would right now enjoy intense pleasure but… Yes, I would, I would certainly would翻譯社 but over a lifetime. I think翻譯社 I would think almost the complete majority here would agree that they would .rather be hu … a human with higher pleasure then be that rat with intense pleasure for a momo … momentary period of time. Now in answer to your question, I think this proves. Well翻譯社 I won't say proves翻譯社 I think the conclusion is that Mill… Mill’s Theory that when the majority of the people are asked what they would rather do umm they will answer that they would rather engage in a higher pleasure.
The Simpsons: The Simpsons, hi-diddley-ho pedal to the metalophiles. Flanders? Since when do you like anything cool? Well I don’t care for the speed but I can't get enough of that safety gear, helmets, roll bars, caution flags. I like the fresh air and looking at the poor people in the infield. Dang Cleetus why did you have to park by my parents. Now honey they’re my parents too.
Michael Sandel: All right翻譯社 is there anyone, who disagrees with Joe and who thinks that our experiment disproves Mill’s test, shows that that’s not an adequate way, that you can’t distinguish higher pleasures within the utilitarian framework? Yes.
Michael Sandel: That's great, that’s right. What's your name?
Laneshia: Like I guess just sitting watching The Simpsons it’s entertaining because they make jokes and they make us laugh but like someone has to tell us that Shakespeare was this great writer, we had to be taught how to read him, how to understand him. We had to be taught how to kind of take in Rembrandt and kind of analyze a painting.
Joe: Can I cite another example briefly?
John: if you’ve tried both of them and you will prefer the higher one naturally always.
Fear Factor: Imagine a world where your greatest fears become reality翻譯社 each show six contestants around the country battle each other in three extreme stunts, these stunts are designed to challenge the contestants both physically and mentally. Six contestants, three stunts, one winner. Fear Factor
Michael Sandel: Joe, so if you had to spend the rest your life on a farm in Kansas翻譯社 with only, with only Shakespeare or the collected episodes of the Simpsons. You would prefer Shakespeare? What do you conclude from that about John Stuart Mill's test, that the test of a higher pleasure is whether people who have experienced both prefer it


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